Yet what does it mean to speak of an 'idea'?Oddly enough, even though ideas are obviously the central theme, or operational 'atom', of ideonomy, the problem of what the fundamental nature and deftion of 'idea' is-or of what the generic concept or thing 'idea' represents-may lie outside the scope of ideonomy itself. The matter might more properly be addressed by such fields as noology, neurology, artificial intelligence, and even philosophy. Or perhaps the issue really belongs to meta-ideonomy, much as the ultimate nature of number, and of mathematics itself, are the natural concern of metamathematics. (When the prefix 'meta' is added to the name of a subject, it entitles inquiry into the subject's foundations.) These questions not only touch on deep, unresolved issues in philosophy, but also suggest an empirical need for the future planning and execution of certain scientific experiments aimed at clarifying the nature of mental phenomena and the mutual relationship of the physical and mental orders. At the present time it would be as pretentious to ask ideonomy for, as for ideonomy to attempt to furnish, any final or profound definition of 'idea'. Of course, an ideonomist whose life was threatened would no doubt say many impressive things. 'Ideas,' he might announce, 'are simply [significant and irredundant] rational [cognitive as opposed to essentially psychic] states [either discrete or quasi-discrete]', 'are generic things', "are patterns of patterns', 'are all that is higher', 'are patterns that regulate thought, or 'are transitive mental states." Ennoia is an Ancient Greek feminine noun meaning idea, concept, or thought. Or etymologically, 'a thing within the mind - which probably is still the most honest definition of 'idea'! A source of confusion here is no doubt a fallacious concern over the assertion that ideonomy is to be the science of ideas. All sciences are sciences both of ideas and things, and they investigate the nature and possibilities of general ideas. Ideonomy differs from other sciences only in the degree of universality of its ideas and interests, or in their irreducibility to any field or finite set of fields. A science such as biology is not regarded as less plausible because of the fact that, despite its use of concepts, it is unable to give a rigorous and essential definition of 'concept. Once again, although ideonomy is the science of ideas in general, it is particularly interested in discovering, developing, and using ideas that are possessed of the greatest possible generality. In other words, the more general given ideas are, the more interest they are apt to have to ideonomy. At least this is true as a first approximation, since other properties condition the ideonomic interest and importance of different ideas, including the fundamentality, the simplicity and complexity, and the generative and explanatory power of ideas.